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Abstract
In this paper we investigate what happens to ￿rms after they default on their bank loans.
We approach this question by establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of
default and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique dataset
from Portugal, we observe that half of the default episodes last 5 quarters or less and that larger
￿rms have shorter default periods. Most ￿rms continue to have access to credit immediately
after default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have more di¢ culties in
regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default was long and severe, if they borrow
from only one bank or if they default with their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting
￿rms record another default in the future. We observe that ￿rms with repeated defaults are,
on average, smaller and have experienced longer and more severe defaults.
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11 Introduction
By granting credit, banks play a crucial role in the economy as liquidity providers (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983). Virtually all loans granted by banks have a positive default probability, which is
taken into account by banks in their pricing decisions. While there is a large literature on which
factors may lead ￿rms to default on their debts, there is surprisingly scarce evidence on what
happens to ￿rms after they default1. We aim to ￿ll this gap in the literature by studying two
broad questions: What happens to ￿rms post-default? And when are ￿rms able to regain access
to ￿nancial markets after experiencing an episode of ￿nancial distress/ default?
These questions should be interesting in any context, but the increase in bank loan delinquencies
and defaults worldwide surrounding the 2007-2010 Global Financial Crisis makes this research
even more relevant. How many of these ￿rms will be able to overcome ￿nancial distress and regain
access to credit? Which factors may be more relevant in this process? Do default characteristics
in￿ uence the likelihood of regaining access to credit markets? By trying to provide answers to these
questions, we hope to provide relevant and timely empirical evidence on this issue. We contribute
to the existing literature by establishing a set of stylized facts regarding the trajectory of ￿rms
post-default. We focus not only on the duration of ￿nancial distress but also on the ability to
re-access credit markets.
To answer the questions mentioned above, we use a unique dataset from Portugal, the Central
Credit Register (CRC), which covers virtually all bank loans granted to Portuguese ￿rms between
1995 and 20082. This time period captures a full credit cycle with a variety of macroeconomic
conditions, including the convergence process to the European Monetary Union and the 2007-
2008 ￿nancial crisis. The CRC collects information on all loans undertaken by each ￿rm in any
￿nancial institution in Portugal. One of its main goals is to support participating credit institutions
in the assessment of credit risk. The information shared between banks within the scope of
1For a review of the literature on factors in￿ uencing ￿rm default see, for example, Du¢ e and Singleton (2003) or
Saunders and Allen (2002).
2We acknowledge that bank credit is not the only source of external ￿nancing that is available to Portuguese
￿rms. Nevertheless, and similarly to what happens in the rest of Europe, bank credit is the main source of external
￿nancing for Portuguese (and European) ￿rms. According to the results of the ECB "Survey on the access to ￿nance
of small and medium-sized enterprises in the euro area" for H2-2009, 70% of Euro area SMEs report using a bank
loan, overdraft, or line of credit during the last 6 months, compared to market-based ￿nancing (where only 2.2% of
SMEs had issued debt or equity securities) and to trade credit (24% of SMEs) (ECB, 2010).
2this database should therefore have an important role in reducing the traditional information
asymmetry problems between borrowers and lenders3.
Our results are organized in two parts: 1) the ￿in default￿and 2) the ￿post default￿periods.
With respect to the ￿in default￿period we ￿nd that i) 50% of default episodes last 5 quarters
or less, and of these, half are resolved in less than 1 or 2 quarters; ii) at the same time, we also
observe that if a default episode is not solved in less than 1 year it can take several years to be
cleared; iii) the duration of the default is linked to its severity, that is, the more signi￿cant the
default, the longer it takes to be resolved; iv) not all bank loan default episodes generate write-o⁄s
for the banks: only 31% of default events lead to write-o⁄s; and v) of those loans that lead to a
write-o⁄, the average loss for the bank is 34%.
Regarding the ￿post default￿period our results show that i) in the ￿rst quarter after exiting
default, 59% of ￿rms have access to credit, but of these, less than one quarter of ￿rms were able
to increase their bank debt; ii) if a ￿rm is not able to regain access to credit in the ￿rst year after
exiting default then the likelihood of obtaining credit at any given moment is less than 1%; iii) the
duration of exclusion is strongly related to the severity of the default episode. That is, the larger
the amount defaulted on, the larger the written-o⁄ amount, or the longer the default period, the
longer the period of exclusion will be; iv) re-access mostly occurs through banks with whom the
￿rm had ongoing lending relationships before the default was resolved; v) there is a high degree of
recidivism: after one year of clearing the default, almost 25% of ￿rms had defaulted again on their
bank loan(s); and vi) ￿rms that are able to exit default during recession periods regain access to
credit faster and are less likely to default again.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review some of the relevant
literature, focusing primarily on empirical ￿ndings, and in Section 3 we describe the data. Our
main results are analyzed in two separate sections: in Section 4 we examine in some detail what is
happening to ￿rms while they are in default, whereas in Section 5 we focus our analysis on what
happens to ￿rms after they are no longer classi￿ed as being in default. Finally, in Section 6 we
conclude.
3Jappelli and Pagano (1993, 2006) note that public credit registries have the bene￿ts of: (i) improving banks￿
knowledge of applicants￿characteristics, reducing adverse selection problems; (ii) reducing the "informational rents"
that banks could otherwise charge customers; (iii) act as a borrower discipline device; and (iv) eliminate or reduce
borrowers￿incentives to become "over-indebted", derived from simultaneously borrowing from multiple lenders.
32 Related literature
The bulk of empirical research on default and recovery after ￿nancial distress focuses on publicly
traded ￿rms in the United States, with an emphasis on bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation
procedures4. For instance, Franks and Torous (1989), Platt and Platt (1991), Bandopadhyaya
(1994), Helwege (1999), and Denis and Rodgers (2007) all consider samples of publicly traded
￿rms that ￿le for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to analyze the e⁄ect of various regressors
as well as time on the duration of default. The time in default ranges from 16-32 months on
average, but size (measured by liabilities, number of employees, or number of creditors) is an
important determinant of the duration of default, with smaller ￿rms exiting sooner (Denis and
Rodgers, 2007; Morrison, 2007).
Post default performance of large ￿rms appears to be poor. On average, only 29% of ￿rms
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization successfully reorganize each year, but Hotchkiss et al.
(2008) note that many of the con￿rmed reorganizations are, in fact, liquidation plans. Analysis
of post-bankruptcy cash ￿ ows for 89 ￿rms by Alderson and Betker (1999) corroborates earlier
￿ndings by Hotchkiss (1995), LoPucki and Whitford (1993), and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997)
that operating margins are poor and debt ratios are above industry median levels post-bankruptcy.
As a consequence of this performance, recidivism rates are high, with one-quarter to one-third of
￿rms subsequently restructuring their debt within ￿ve years of initially emerging from bankruptcy.
Acharya et al. (2007) also ￿nd that creditor recoveries are signi￿cantly lower when the ￿rms in
default operate in a distressed industry.
It is clear that the experiences of publicly traded US ￿rms are not representative of the overall
universe of US ￿rms, which, on average, have only 20 employees (Axtell, 2001). However, few
papers examine small or privately-held ￿rms; Berkowitz and White (2004) is one notable exception.
The authors consider how personal bankruptcy procedures a⁄ect small ￿rms￿access to credit in
an environment where unincorporated ￿rms debts are the liabilities of the ￿rm owner. Therefore,
if the ￿rm fails, the owner can ￿le for bankruptcy and business, as well as unsecured personal
debts, will be discharged. Using variation in personal bankruptcy exemptions across US states, it
4Our literature review focuses on research related to what happens to ￿rms after an episode of ￿nancial distress.
However, there are also some relevant recent papers that examine post-distress patterns amongst other borrower
types, namely personal bankruptcy (Cohen-Cole et al. (2009) and Han and Li (2009)), commercial real estate loans
(Brown et al. (2006)) and home mortgages (Adelino et al. (2009) and Haughwout et al. (2009)).
4is found that small business are more likely to be denied credit if they are located in states with
high homestead exemptions, and if loans are received, the values are smaller, with higher interest
rates.
Analysis on ￿rm default and recovery outside of the US is limited, but such analysis is important
since bankruptcy and liquidation procedures vary across the world. In general, Claessens and
Klapper (2005) ￿nd that bankruptcy ￿ling rates are higher in countries with more e¢ cient judicial
systems. In response to di⁄erent degrees of creditor protection, Davydenko and Franks (2008) ￿nd
that banks in France, Germany, and the UK signi￿cantly adjust their lending and reorganization to
the national bankruptcy code. At the time of loan origination collateral requirements will directly
re￿ ect a bank￿ s ability to realize assets upon default. As a result, adjustments by banks will be
able to reduce, but not fully eliminate, the e⁄ect of the bankruptcy code on default outcomes.
Evidence on the duration and severity of defaults by ￿rms outside the US is also scarce. Franks
and Sussman (2005) consider a sample of 542 small- and medium-sized ￿nancially distressed UK
￿rms that are transferred to their bank￿ s workout unit, ￿nding that, on average, these ￿rms spend
7.5 months in the bank￿ s workout unit and 60% of ￿rms in the sample operate as going concerns.
Secured creditors in the country fare well within the formal bankruptcy regime and 75% of small
￿rms that default subsequently enter formal bankruptcy receivership (Franks and Sussman, 2005),
while average bank recovery rates are 75% as ￿rm assets are pledged as collateral to banks in most
cases. In a study of Sweden￿ s auction bankruptcy system for small ￿rms, Thorburn (2000) ￿nds
that three-quarters of ￿rms are auctioned as going concerns, and the direct costs average 6.4%
of pre-￿ling value of assets, suggesting that it is an e¢ cient restructuring mechanism for small
￿rms. In Portugal, Antunes (2005) ￿nds that the severity of default in￿ uences the probability of
liquidation, but that the number of employees is the largest determinant of the time pro￿le of the
liquidation/ recovery process5.
Finally, another important dimension of the costs of default are the losses incurred directly
(and indirectly) by banks. The implementation of Basel II contributed to some expansion of the
literature on recovery rates and loss given default (LGD). Some recent examples are Altman et al.
(2005), Carvalho and Dermine (2006), Bruche and GonzÆlez-Aguado (2010), and Bastos (2010).
5Refer to appendix 1 for a comparison of bankruptcy codes in Portugal and the US.
5All in all, most of the existing literature on default and recoveries after ￿nancial distress focuses
on US publicly traded ￿rms. Evidence on small and medium enterprises, especially outside the
US, is also relatively scarce. Moreover, most of this literature focuses on bankruptcy, liquidation
and reorganization procedures. Our work makes a contribution to ￿ll both of these gaps in the
literature. On one hand, we analyze the entire universe of ￿rms with access to bank loans in a
European country. On the other hand, we focus on a broader event related to ￿nancial distress:
loan default.
3 Data
The main data source used in this paper is the Central Credit Register (CRC), which is held and
managed by the Banco de Portugal. Financial institutions granting credit in Portugal are obliged
to, on a monthly basis, report to the CRC all loans granted above 50 euros. This database includes
information on loan amounts as well as some loan characteristics. It is possible to know if the loan
is a joint or single liability, or if it is an o⁄-balance sheet item (such as the undrawn amount
of a credit line or a credit card). More importantly for the purposes of our study, the database
includes information on loan defaults and renegotiations. All ￿nancial institutions are obliged to
report data to the CRC and are allowed to consult information on their current and prospective
borrowers, with their previous consent. As a result, when granting a new loan, a bank can easily
observe whether the applicant has any amount of credit overdue at that moment, as well as the
total amount borrowed from di⁄erent banks.
Using information contained in the CRC between 1995 and 2008, we identify all ￿rms that
record at least one episode of default during this period6. In the CRC, a default can be classi￿ed
as a loan with late repayment (coded as Type 7 in the database) or as a liability involving litigation
(coded as Type 8)7. We consider that there is a default only when a ￿rm records a loan in either
6We exclude unincorporated businesses from this analysis, as their assets are not autonomous from those of the
owner. For statistical purposes, these businesses are usually classi￿ed as households.
7The borrowers may be in arrears in relation to the principal and/or interest and other
costs. For the principal, there is a default if at least 30 days have elapsed from the due
date. For interest and other costs, there is a default from the date on which payments should
have been made. For further details on this database, please see http://www.bportugal.pt/en-
US/PublicacoeseIntervencoes/Banco/CadernosdoBanco/Tumbnails%20List%20Template/Central%20Credit%20Register.pdf.
6of these two categories for an entire quarter. This avoids mining the data with very short-lived
episodes, possibly related to reporting errors or problems in bank transfers, for instance8.
Our unit of observation is a ￿rm-quarter pair. Using quarterly data for the period 1995-2008,
there are more than 1 million default observations, referring to 165,165 di⁄erent default episodes
in more than 100 thousand ￿rms9. We consider that a ￿rm emerges from default when it does not
record a default on bank loans in a given quarter, but it was in default during the entire previous
quarter. This may mean that the ￿rm is observed in the CRC but with no records referring to
outstanding defaults, or that the ￿rm is no longer present in the CRC. This latter possibility may
imply that the ￿rm was extinguished or that the ￿rm continues to operate but without access to
bank credit.
The amount and quality of the information available are superior to that used in most papers
focusing on default recoveries, which usually analyze only a limited set of publicly traded ￿rms,
and allow us to conduct a richer analysis10.
4 What happens while ￿rms are in default?
During the last decade, the literature on the determinants of ￿rm default increased dramatically,
in part driven by the discussion and subsequent implementation of Basel II. However, much less
attention has been devoted to the dynamics of the default process in itself and, more importantly,
to what happens to ￿rms after they fail to comply with their debt obligations. In this section we
explore the richness of information contained in the Portuguese Credit Register dataset to analyze
these two issues - the "in default" and "post default" periods. In this section we examine in
detail the evolution of default episodes, from their onset until their conclusion. Then, in Section
5, we proceed with our analysis by focusing on what happens to ￿rms after the default episode is
considered resolved.
8We do not include loan write-o⁄s in the de￿nition of default, even though this information is also available in
the CRC. This choice is motivated by the fact that when a bank writes-o⁄ a loan from its books it is implicitly
assuming that the probability of repayment is very small, though still positive.
9We do not have information strictly on a loan-by-loan basis, as banks report information for each borrower
aggregated by loan type.
10In Portugal there are less than one hundred publicly traded companies, while in 2008 there were more than 350
thousand ￿rms operating in the country. This number highlights how partial and incomplete would the results be if
our study would focus only on these companies.
7In general, a default episode can be characterized by three elements: 1) incidence and amount
of the default; 2) the length of the default event; and 3) the losses ultimately faced by the ￿nancial
institution. Understanding better these three elements is of great interest because it has a direct
impact on how ￿nancial institutions manage their risk exposure and how regulatory agencies design
their policies. Below, we analyze each of the three elements.
4.1 Default incidence and amounts
The ￿rst question we address is how the default incidence and the corresponding amounts evolved
in Portugal during the sample period, 1995 to 2008. In Table 1 we present various statistics
regarding the amounts and the incidence of bank loan defaults over time.
Table 1 around here
Several interesting results arise from the analysis of this table. First, during our sample period
there was a substantial expansion of credit to ￿rms in Portugal, as shown by the signi￿cant increase
in the number of ￿rms with access to loans (column 1). As discussed in Antªo et al. (2009), the
liberalization of the Portuguese ￿nancial system in the late 1980s and early 1990s created the
conditions for an expansion of credit granted to the private sector. This growth was fuelled by the
signi￿cant decrease in bank interest rates during the 1990s as the economy gradually converged to
meet the euro accession criteria. The participation in the euro area improved the funding conditions
of Portuguese banks in international wholesale markets, with virtually no exchange rate risk, thus
further contributing to improve the access of Portuguese non-￿nancial ￿rms to bank loans. Against
this background, loans granted to non-￿nancial ￿rms increased by an average annual growth rate
of 12% during these years, re￿ ecting not only an increase in the amount of loans granted to each
￿rm (column 2), but also an increase in the number of ￿rms with access to credit (column 3). In
fact, around 80% of the ￿rms analyzed started to have access to credit after 1995Q1.
Second, at the same time credit expanded in Portugal, the incidence of non-performing loans
had a U-shaped path (column 5). Between 1995 and 2000 there was a signi￿cant decrease (from
14% to 9.6%), but between 2000 and 2008 this rate increased almost every year and reached a
level higher than what was experienced in 1995. Although the default incidence had a U-shaped
path, the default rate had an upward trend, most notably from 2001 onwards, with the period
8average equal to 5.2% (column 11)11. Default rates peaked in 2002, possibly re￿ ecting the increase
in interest rates and the marked slowdown of economic activity after 2000. Most of these new
defaults correspond to smaller ￿rms, as shown by the evolution of amounts in default (column 10).
Hence, despite the increase in default frequencies, its aggregate magnitude has actually decreased
during most of the sample period (see Antªo et al. (2009)).
Third, the average amounts involved in the default episode decreased initially ￿from 1995
to 2000/2001 ￿and remained fairly constant for the rest of the period. For the whole period
the average amount in default was 105,142 euros (column 6). On average, at the beginning of a
default episode, the amount overdue was 31,919 euros (column 10). The decrease of the amounts
in default during the sample period does not necessarily suggest that defaults became less severe,
as the average ￿rm size in the sample also decreased over time. Therefore, to better evaluate how
the severity of default evolves during the sample period, in columns (7) and (8) we depict the
credit overdue ratio for ￿rms in default (the latter column includes o⁄-balance sheet liabilities)12.
This ratio stood, on average, at 64 % (62% if o⁄-balance sheet liabilities are included), having
decreased steadily during the ￿rst half of the time period under analysis. Hence, even though
defaults became more frequent, their size and severity decreased simultaneously during our sample
period.
In sum, during the period 1995-2008, Portugal experienced a rapid expansion of credit to ￿rms.
In the ￿rst half of this period (1995-2000/2001), there was a steady decrease in the incidence rate
of non-performing loans, but in the second half of the period it increased to values similar to what
was observed in 1995. The default rate had a more volatile behavior, mirroring to some extent
overall economic conditions. The year of 2007 marked the beginning of the global ￿nancial crisis
and, not surprisingly, we observe that since this time there has been an increase in the default
incidence rate, as well as an increase of the average amount in default. However, the credit overdue
ratios in 2007 and 2008 are not very di⁄erent from the previous years. As these ratios are de￿ned as
the amount of credit overdue as a percentage of total outstanding loans, the increase of the average
amount in default suggests that ￿rms in default during this more recent period were slightly larger
than before.
11These two variables, default incidence and default rate, have di⁄erent paths because during the sample period
the duration of the ￿in default￿period was not constant.
12These o⁄-balance sheet liabilities include, for example, the undrawn amount of credit lines.
94.2 Time in default
The second aspect of the ￿in default￿ period we consider is its length. That is, after a ￿rm
is declared to be in default with respect to its bank credit, how long does it take until a bank
declares that the ￿rm is no longer in default. Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of the default
duration.
Figure 1 around here
From Figure 1 we see that the default duration is not extremely long. Overall, more than 50%
of ￿rms exit default in 5 quarters or less and more than 25% of ￿rms exit default in 2 quarters or
less. Over time, these numbers do not vary signi￿cantly for the median duration, ranging between
3 and 6 quarters. The ￿rst quartile of the distribution of default durations remains unchanged
during the full period. Regarding the rest of the distribution, the story is somewhat di⁄erent. In
particular, the 25% longest default spells are longer than 14 quarters and during the sample period
this number oscillated between 11 and 15 quarters.
If severity and length of the default episodes are positively correlated, then it seems that
over time, the importance of the least problematic events did not change much. We get to this
conclusion because we see that the ￿rst quartile of the default duration distribution was fairly stable
throughout the sample period. On the other hand, from the variability of the third quartile of the
default distribution, it seems that the importance of the more severe cases oscillated signi￿cantly
during the sample period.
To complement the results in Figure 1, we present estimates of the survival and hazard functions
for the ￿in default￿period13.
Figure 2 around here
Figure 3 around here
From Figures 2 and 3, two important results emerge. First, default spells can be very long.
Even though the third quartile of the distribution is less than 14 quarters, more than 10% of
episodes last more than 24 quarters (6 years). This result is visible in the survival function (Figure
13The survivor function is de￿ned as the probability of remaining in default until t: S(t) = Pr(T ￿ t) = 1 ￿ F(t).
The hazard function is de￿ned as the probability of a ￿rm leaving default in the time interval [t;t+dt), conditional
on being in default: h(t) = lim
Pr(t￿T￿t+dtjT￿t)
dt ;dt ! 0.
102). Second, the exit rate of default drops sharply in the ￿rst 2 years, from around 20% to slightly
more than 6%. This is important because it suggests that when a default episode is not resolved
in the ￿rst four to six quarters, then it takes much longer to be resolved.
An interesting question is to know how the default amounts evolve as default duration increases.
Tables 2A and 2B shed light on this question.
Table 2A around here
Table 2B around here
In these two tables we examine two di⁄erent perspectives on default duration. First, in Table
2A we show what is happening to the amounts in default, the credit overdue ratio and the number
of bank relationships as the length of the default period is increasing. Second, in Table 2B we
present the same statistics but in this case at the start of the default event, for ￿rms with di⁄erent
default durations. More speci￿cally, in Table 2A each line refers to the current default duration of
each ￿rm (￿rms that have been in default so far for 1 quarter, 2 quarters, etc., up to 7 quarters),
whereas in Table 2B each line refers to ￿rms with di⁄erent total default durations (i.e., ￿rms that
recorded a default episode that lasted for 1 quarter, 2 quarters, etc., up to 8 quarters).
The joint analysis of these two tables indicates two important things: 1) as the default duration
increases the situation worsens; and 2) the ￿rms that stay longer in default are those whose
initial conditions were worse than those of ￿rms that exit faster. Regarding the worsening of
the situation (Table 2A), there is a component that is somewhat mechanic, that is, the amounts
overdue accumulate automatically every period. Besides this accumulation e⁄ect, there is also
a true worsening of situation e⁄ect. The amounts overdue and the credit overdue ratio increase
signi￿cantly with each quarter in default. Moreover, the percentage of bank relationships on which
the ￿rm defaults also increases with default duration (￿rms in default borrow, on average, from
more than 2 di⁄erent banks).
Regarding the conditions ￿rms enter default with (Table 2B), we see that the credit overdue
ratios at the start of the event are larger for ￿rms that ended up staying longer in default ￿this
is visible in columns (4) and (5). Also, the total amount outstanding at the start of the default
episode is, on average, larger for ￿rms with shorter default episodes, thus suggesting that larger
￿rms are able to leave default earlier (columns 6 and 7).
11From the analysis of the default period, we conclude that the longer a ￿rm stays in default
the more complicated its situation becomes. Another important learning is that ￿rms that stay
longer in default, are also ￿rms whose conditions at the start of the default were worse. We can
re-interpret these results by considering that default events can be originated by temporary or
permanent shocks. In the case of temporary shocks it may be more advantageous for both the
borrower and lender to engage in negotiations in order to avoid problems becoming unmanageable.
In the case of permanent shocks the lender may not have much interest in negotiating as it is less
likely that the borrower will ever be able to repay its debt.
4.3 Losses incurred by banks
The third and ￿nal aspect of the default period that we analyze relates to the losses generated
by the default, that is, how costly can a default episode be for banks. In our dataset, we only
observe one component of this cost, i.e., we only observe the amounts that the bank declares to
be write-o⁄s. In order to have a better measure of the costs of a default for banks we would
need to have information on legal and processing costs and also on collateral and guarantees that
mitigate these losses. Despite the caveats that our measure of loss estimates has, we still ￿nd it
to be su¢ ciently interesting and informative. Table 3 shows the evolution of bank losses due to
written-o⁄ loans over time.
Table 3 around here
In this table we present two main statistics regarding bank losses due to written-o⁄ loans.
The ￿rst is the unconditional loss, that is, given all default episodes, what is the average loss
incurred by the bank (columns (1)-(5)). In this case we ￿nd that on average any given default
will generate a loss due to write-o⁄s of 10.3% of the total amount outstanding at the time the
default episode ends. This ￿gure is much lower than the 45% loss given default rate considered
for corporate uncollateralized loans in the foundation approach of Basel II. However, as we do not
have information on collateral nor on legal costs, this comparison is not clear-cut.
The second statistic is the conditional loss, that is, given all default episodes that lead to a
write-o⁄, what is the average loss incurred by the bank (columns (6)-(10)). For this case, the
￿gure is substantially higher, 33.7%, but this large di⁄erence comes mainly from the fact that
12most default episodes do not lead to any write-o⁄ (only 30% of default events generate a write-o⁄
for the bank)14.
Another interesting result is that, over time, the average unconditional loss has increased
gradually (from 3% to 11%), whereas the average conditional loss varied signi￿cantly during the
sample period (between 26% and 45%). The steady increase of the unconditional loss possibly
re￿ ects changes in the strategic behavior of banks, which may have become more prone to writing-
o⁄ loans from their balance sheet when they consider the likelihood of payment to be very low,
instead of keeping bad quality loans in their assets for a long period of time. Nevertheless, to
a large extent, the increase in the number of written-o⁄ loans over time re￿ ects a mechanical
accumulation process, as some banks keep loans classi￿ed in this category for a long period.
A ￿nal result relates to the duration of the default event and the in￿ icted loss. In the last 4
columns of Table 3 we show that for loans in default for more than 1 year, the unconditional loss
almost doubles (18.2% vs. 10.3%).
5 What happens after exiting default?
A second question we address in this paper is what happens to a ￿rm after leaving default. In
particular, we are interested in knowing if ￿rms are able to borrow again, and if so, how long it
takes for this to happen; when a ￿rm is able to borrow again does it borrow from the same lender
or from a di⁄erent lender; and ￿nally, do ￿rms tend to default again or not.
In Table 4 we provide a broad picture with respect to some of these questions.
Table 4 around here.
The ￿rst three columns of Table 4 show the number of default episodes that are resolved
every year. Even though the number of default episodes that are resolved each year increased
substantially during the sample period, the ￿exit rate￿from default was relatively stable during
the same timeframe15. To compute these numbers, i.e., the number of default episodes resolved
and the default ￿exit rate￿ , we count all ￿rms that were in default in period t￿1 and were not in
period t, taking into account only the ￿rst default episode of each ￿rm during the sample period.
14The percentage of default events is the ratio between the values in columns (6) and (1) from Table 3.
15In 2008 the value is substantially lower than for the other years because the last quarter of 2008 was excluded
from the analysis.
13Once a ￿rm leaves default, there are two main possibilities: either the ￿rm continues to be
present in the Credit Register in the quarter after the ￿rst default episode has been resolved
(column 4); or it ceases to be reported by banks (column 18). In the latter case, the lack of
presence in the CRC may re￿ ect the fact that the ￿rm ceased to operate. However, it is also
possible that ￿rms survive without having access to bank loans. A rough estimate suggests that
at least 12% of the ￿rms that disappear from the CRC after default are still operating afterwards.
This may either re￿ ect an inability to regain access to bank credit after default or, alternatively,
it may be a decision made by the ￿rms, which may prefer to use internal funds or trade credit to
￿nance themselves. These e⁄ects are not easily disentangled16.
One of the most surprising results we obtain when analyzing post-default behavior is that
almost half of the ￿rms that resolve their ￿rst default episode record at least one more default
episode in the following 3 years (column 7). The intensity of this recidivist behavior is impressive,
especially taking into account that information on loan defaults is shared between banks using
the CRC. It appears that banks are generally willing to continue to grant loans to ￿rms after
they resolve an episode of ￿nancial distress, despite facing remarkably high default probabilities.
From this data we cannot tell whether recidivism is caused by ￿nancial (inability to borrow) or by
economic (insolvency) problems. If ￿nancial problems are the main reason, then there is mutual
interest of the lender and the borrower to overcome the problems that may be originating the
default, whereas if the problems are economic then it should not be optimal to lend more to the
￿rm17.
We can distinguish between two types of re-access: i) simple access (summing up columns 10
and 12); and ii) increased access (considering only column 10). In the former case, we consider
that the ￿rm has regained access simply if it continues to have access to any bank loans after the
16This estimate was conducted by searching for the ￿rms that are not in the CRC in the 3 years after default
(column 8) in another dataset, Quadros de Pessoal. This database covers all Portuguese ￿rms with more than 10
employees. Hence, the estimate presented is a lower bound for the number of ￿rms that no longer have access to
credit markets after default. From the 5602 ￿rms that cannot be found in the CRC in the 3 years after the default
is cleared (considering only defaults terminated until 2006), at least 686 ￿rms are found to still be operating, but
without having access to bank loans. Given this, the maximum bankruptcy or liquidation rate after default is around
8%, thus showing that most ￿rms are able to overcome a default episode.
17Adelino et al. (2009) and Haughwout et al. (2009) ￿nd evidence of signi￿cant recidivism problems in mort-
gages (the latter paper focuses on subprime loans). In both papers, the authors examine the interaction between
renegotiation and the incentives for repeated defaults.
14default is cleared (we refer to this de￿nition as ￿broad access￿ )18. In the latter, we consider a
stricter access de￿nition and take into account only those cases in which the ￿rm had access to a
new loan after default (￿strict access￿ ). Since we do not have information on a loan-by-loan basis,
we consider all cases in which the total amount outstanding is larger than that observed when the
default ended19.
Focusing on what happens in the quarter immediately after the ￿rms￿￿rst default episode is
resolved, we observe that access rates depend crucially on the access de￿nition we use. In the case
of strict access, only 13% of ￿rms were able to increase their bank credit in the ￿rst quarter after
default. With respect to the broad access de￿nition, the numbers are substantially di⁄erent. In
this case, 59% of ￿rms had access to credit in the ￿rst quarter after resolving the default20. Hence,
most ￿rms do not face a long exclusion from credit markets as a penalty for their past defaults.
Over time these two statistics have di⁄erent paths. While in the case of strict access there was a
fairly monotone decrease, in the case of broad access there was some volatility during the sample
period: instantaneous access rates decreased until 1998, but peaked in 2002. Afterwards, there
was a gradual decrease.
We consider two additional possible outcomes after default: ￿rms that have access to loans but
still record some written-o⁄ loans (9%) and ￿rms only with written-o⁄ loans, that is, no access
(14%). These two outcomes lie somewhere between default and access. On one hand, these ￿rms
are not technically in default. On the other hand, we cannot consider that the problems generated
by the default event are fully overcome.
5.1 Duration of exclusion
Above we provided some information regarding the process of regaining access to credit after a
default is cleared. In this subsection, we add to the previous results by analyzing more aspects of
this process. To start, we show non-parametric estimates of the survival and hazard functions of
the time it takes for a ￿rm to borrow again. These results refer to the two de￿nitions of access
18In fact, most ￿rms never lose access to credit completely while they are in default, as ￿rms usually default only
in a part of their total outstanding commitments.
19Given that a signi￿cant part of loans to ￿rms has short maturities, a ￿rm may have had access to a new loan (or
loan renewal) even if the total outstanding amount did not increase. This access de￿nition may then be too strict,
thus justifying the need to consider the two alternative de￿nitions.
20The 59% ￿gure is the sum of the last row of columns (11) and (13) from Table 4.
15discussed previously, that is, the ability to borrow more money than before (strict de￿nition) and
the ability to keep having some loans (broad de￿nition). Figures 4 and 5 refer to the former, while
Figures 6 and 7 refer to the latter.
Figure 4 around here
Figure 5 around here
Figure 6 around here
Figure 7 around here
As is visible in these ￿gures, the two de￿nitions are substantially di⁄erent: while in one case
around 60% of ￿rms never regain access again (the strict de￿nition of access), in the other case,
this ￿gure is substantially lower and it is slightly less than 25%. Despite the di⁄erences that are
found in the right tail of the survival function, when we compare the two hazard functions we see
that their shapes are very similar. In particular, we see that the ￿rst 4 to 6 quarters after exiting
default are fundamental for determining the ability to regain access. When a ￿rm is not able to
regain access in this period, the probability of regaining access at any given time becomes very
low (almost 0%).
In Table 5 we look at di⁄erent snapshots of the distribution of possible outcomes after default
in di⁄erent moments in time, namely 1 quarter, 2 quarters and 1, 2 and 3 years after the ￿rst
default episode of each ￿rm ends. We consider the same set of outcomes depicted in Table 4.
Table 5 around here
Regarding the ￿rms that continue to be observed in the CRC dataset after default, several
things happen. First, we see that the percentage of ￿rms with more access and without problem
loans is relatively stable over time (column 2). At the same time, the percentage of ￿rms that has
access to credit, but less than before, decreases substantially as time goes by ￿it goes from 46% to
19% in 3 years (column 4). This large variation seems to be directly related to recidivism, as after 6
months around 16% of ￿rms are in default again and after 1 year this value is around 24% (column
10). If we add columns (4) and (10) we see that the sum of the two is relatively stable over time.
This suggests that a strong indicator of recidivism may be the inability to borrow more than before.
Regarding the other possible outcomes, ￿rms with access but still with written-o⁄ loans (columns
165 and 6) and ￿rms only with written-o⁄ loans but no access (columns 7 and 8), we observe that
over time the number of ￿rms with access and with written o⁄ loans decreases substantially while
the number of ￿rms without access and with written-o⁄loans does not change much. Finally, with
respect to the ￿rms that are not observed in the CRC we see that this percentage is relatively
stable in the ￿rst year, but after 2 and 3 years it increases substantially ￿it goes from around
18% to 30%. This possibly re￿ ects the relatively short life span of micro and small ￿rms, which
comprise the bulk of our sample21.
5.2 Determinants of the duration of exclusion
In order to better understand why some ￿rms are able to regain access relatively fast after exiting
default, while other ￿rms are not, we show in Tables 6 and 7 how the severity of the default episode
may help explaining these di⁄erences.
Table 6 around here
Table 7 around here
In these two tables we compare various default severity measures (credit outstanding, credit
overdue, existence of write-o⁄s, duration of default) for ￿rms that were able to regain access after 1
and 3 years and ￿rms that were not. In Table 6 we consider the broader de￿nition of access, whereas
in Table 7 we provide similar results for the stricter de￿nition. In all cases we systematically ￿nd
that the probability of regaining access is lower when the default events were longer and more
severe. This is not surprising and to some extent it should be expected. This result re￿ ects not
only the fact that banks will punish harder ￿rms that generate more losses but it also re￿ ects the
fact that ￿rms that generate more losses are also those with more ￿nancial problems and therefore
less credit worthy.
We also observe that larger ￿rms regain access to credit more easily than smaller ￿rms. The
same is true for ￿rms that hold more bank relationships, though this may also be correlated with
￿rm size. Our interpretation is that large ￿rms are usually perceived as less risky and more stable.
Therefore, banks are willing to extend credit faster to large than to small ￿rms. Another result we
21According to Mata and Portugal (1994, 2004), the median life expectancy for Portuguese ￿rms is around 4 to 5
years.
17obtain is that ￿rms that default with their main bank lender also face more di¢ culties in regaining
access to bank loans. This result, together with the e⁄ect of holding more bank relationships,
re￿ ects the costs ￿rms may have when their pool of lenders is not su¢ ciently diversi￿ed. Thus,
when the relationship between a borrower and a lender is interrupted due to ￿nancial distress, ￿rms
will face more di¢ culties in regaining access to credit if they borrow from one or few banks or if they
default with their main lender. This increased di¢ culty should re￿ ect the destruction of value that
had been created with that relationship, as smaller and opaque ￿rms transmit valuable information
to their lenders over time, which cannot be easily transferred to a new bank relationship.
In order to test whether the previous results hold in a multivariate setting and at the same
time to be able to tell which factors matter more for the speed of re-access, we estimate a Cox
proportional hazard model for the time to access, such that:
h(t;Xi) =  (Xi;￿)h0
where  (:) is a non-negative function of Xi and ￿, the vectors of covariates and parameters,
and h0 is the baseline hazard. In this model, the baseline hazard is common to all ￿rms and
individual hazard functions di⁄er from each other proportionally, with  (:) representing the factor
of proportionality. One advantage of this method is that it is a semi-parametric approach, thus
allowing us to estimate ￿ without specifying the form of the baseline hazard. Under this setup,
the covariates do not a⁄ect the shape of the overall hazard function, conditioning only the relative
failure risk of each ￿rm. The failure risk is de￿ned as the time until a ￿rm regains access to credit
(using our two di⁄erent de￿nitions of access) after it has resolved its ￿rst default episode.
The estimation results, which are presented in the form of hazard ratios, are shown in Table
822. Columns (1) to (4) refer to the broad access de￿nition, whereas columns (5) to (8) consider
the strict de￿nition. The columns di⁄er in the time controls used, as discussed below.
Table 8 around here
The results are broadly consistent with those provided by the analysis of Tables 6 and 7. Taking
the total amount of credit outstanding as a proxy for ￿rm size, we observe that larger ￿rms regain
22In these regressions, an estimated coe¢ cient lower than 1, should be interpreted as contributing to a longer time
until the ￿rm regains access to credit.
18access faster (columns (1)-(4)). However, this result is not strongly statistically signi￿cant when
we consider the time it takes a ￿rm to regain access to a new bank loan after default (columns
(5)-(8)). The intensity of the default episode is a key determinant in the process of regaining
access: ￿rms that recorded higher credit overdue ratios and higher loss rates take more time to
regain access to credit, specially in the broad de￿nition. The impact of default duration goes in
the same direction, but now the e⁄ect is stronger for the stricter access de￿nition, i.e., a longer
default harms the ability of ￿rms to have access to new bank loans.
The choice of the number of bank relationships also seems to in￿ uence how easily ￿rms regain
access after default, though only in the broader de￿nition23. Firms that borrow from more banks
take more time to regain access to bank loans. This result is not entirely in line with the insights we
gained from Table 6, where we observed that ￿rms with more bank relationships were more likely to
regain access. However, this previous result could be somewhat in￿ uenced by the strong correlation
between ￿rm size and the number of bank relationships. This fact may explain why this result
does not hold in a multivariate setting. Indeed, when controlling for the total amount of credit
outstanding of each ￿rm, we observe that ￿rms with many bank relationships may actually have
more di¢ culties in regaining access to bank loans. Hence, engaging in single bank relationships
may provide some bene￿ts for ￿rms in ￿nancial distress24. We also ￿nd that ￿rms that default
on a larger percentage of existing bank relationships take more time to regain access to credit,
which may also be regarded as evidence that more severe default episodes lead to a more prolonged
exclusion from credit markets.
Finally, with respect to ￿rms that default with their main lender, the results are rather mixed:
these ￿rms seem to have more di¢ culties in having access to new loans, but the opposite happens
when the broad de￿nition of access is considered. This result is likely driven by the way we de￿ne
access in the latter case: as mentioned before, we consider that a ￿rm regains access when it
records a positive amount of credit outstanding without having any problem loans. Thus, if a
￿rm defaults for a given period of time and at some point it is able to repay the debt overdue, we
consider that the ￿rm has regained access. As we observe that most ￿rms actually default with
23The results for the stricter de￿nition are not statistically signi￿cant at a 5% level.
24For instance, Carmignani and Omiccioli (2007) argue that the overall e⁄ect of more concentrated banking
relationships is a lower probability of liquidation, but a higher probability of ￿nancial distress. In turn, Elsas and
Krahnen (1998) show that when there are strong bank-customer relationships, banks provide liquidity insurance to
￿rms in ￿nancial distress.
19their main lender, the time it takes to regain access may be mechanically driven by this feature of
the data.
As mentioned above, the di⁄erent columns in Table 8 consider essentially the same explanatory
variables, with the exception of time controls. Time e⁄ects seem to play a relevant role: ￿rms that
emerged from default in the earlier years of our sample took less time to regain access to credit
than ￿rms that defaulted in more recent years. In order to better explore these e⁄ects, in columns
(4) and (8) we include a binary variable for recession years. We ￿nd that ￿rms that exit default
during recessions are able to regain access to bank loans sooner, controlling for all other default
and loan characteristics. This is an interesting result, as it may suggest that when a ￿rm is
able to resolve an adverse situation during adverse times, banks perceive this as being a signal
of the quality and strength of the ￿rm25. In particular, banks possibly consider that these ￿rms
are of higher quality (in terms of credit worthiness) and therefore grant credit faster than if the
default resolution had happened in non-recession years26. Moreover, these ￿rms are more likely
to have defaulted due to an exogenous systematic shock than due to idiosyncratic fragilities, thus
supporting this creditworthiness assessment by banks27.
5.3 Access and bank choice
Thus far, we observed that many ￿rms regain access to credit after they default, even though only
a smaller percentage has access to new bank loans. A key issue in this analysis is then to look at
which banks are granting these new bank loans. Are ￿rms borrowing from the banks with whom
they had ongoing bank relationships before the default or are they borrowing from new banks?
In Table 9 we provide some preliminary results on this question.
25For robustness purposes, we also considered the e⁄ect of entering default during a recession on the time it takes
until ￿rms regain access to credit, but the results are not statistically signi￿cant. In addition, we also tried to
consider simultaneously the e⁄ect of entering and/or leaving default during a recession, plus an interaction between
these two possibilities (i.e., a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the ￿rm enters and leaves default during
a recession). If this is the case, ￿rms are able to regain access signi￿cantly faster. In contrast, ￿rms that entered
default during a recession should take more time to regain access. The e⁄ect of leaving default during a recession is
not signi￿cant in this speci￿cation.
26Acharya et al. (2007) study the impact of industry-wide distress on the recoveries of defaulted ￿rms in the US
and ￿nd that defaulting ￿rms that belong to industries in distress are more likely to spend more time in bankruptcy.
However, these ￿rms are also more likely to be restructured than to be acquired or liquidated.
27For robustness purposes, we also estimate probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable
(di), indicating whether the ￿rm regains access to credit in the 3 years after leaving default (di = 1) or not (di = 0),
for both access de￿nitions. The results are qualitatively consistent with those obtained with duration analysis, with
the exception of those relating to the recession variable, which has a negative coe¢ cient in the probit regressions.
These results are available upon request.
20Table 9 around here
We saw previously that, in the quarter immediately after the default episode is cleared, 13%
of ￿rms have access to a new bank loan (Table 4). From this group of ￿rms, almost one third of
the ￿rms obtain that new loan from a bank with which they had no relationship when the default
was resolved (Table 9). This percentage is higher in the ￿rst years of the sample period. When we
examine this situation one and three years after default, we observe that the percentage of ￿rms
that obtained a loan from a new lender increases markedly: 60% after one year and 80% after 3
years.
These results must be analyzed bearing in mind that the Portuguese Credit Register is designed
to be an information sharing mechanism between banks. When a ￿rm defaults on a bank loan,
the other banks currently lending to the ￿rm can observe that. Prospective lenders can also ask to
have access to that information, with the ￿rms￿consent, which is usually the common procedure.
Notwithstanding this, banks seem to be generally willing to give ￿rms a second chance.
In Table 10 we compare ￿rms that regain access through an existing bank relationship to ￿rms
that regain access through a new bank relationship. We consider only the strict de￿nition of access,
as this analysis is relevant only for obtaining new bank loans. We observe that ￿rms that are able
to borrow from a new bank are, on average, smaller, and have fewer bank relationships. This
latter result may be somewhat unexpected, but it possibly re￿ ects the fact that banks may be
reluctant to lend to ￿rms that defaulted and, simultaneously, have many bank relationships (or,
alternatively, ￿rms that already have many bank relationships may ￿nd it too costly to engage in
additional relationships). Firms that obtain a loan from a new bank are also slightly more likely
to have defaulted to their main lender, possibly suggesting that if a ￿rm defaults with its most
important provider of funds, it may be more likely that the ￿rm is forced to look for a new lender,
as the former main bank may not be willing to extend new loans to a ￿rm that defaulted before.
Default duration and severity do not seem to be relevant in explaining why some ￿rms are not
able to obtain loans from a new lender.
Table 10 around here
In order to see if the previous results hold under a multivariate framework, and at the same
time to get estimates of the relative importance of each of the factors, we estimate a probit model
21for the event of accessing credit through an existing bank relationship or through a new one. The
dependent variable in this model is a dummy variable (di) indicating whether the ￿rm had access
to a new bank loan with the same bank (di = 0) or a new bank (di = 1). For explanatory variables
we consider the same variables presented in Table 8 and add a variable indicating the duration of
exclusion (i.e., the time elapsed since the default is cleared until the ￿rm obtains a new loan under
our strict access de￿nition). The results are shown in Table 11.
Table 11 around here
These results indicate that the larger the ￿rm is, the less likely it will obtain a loan from
a new bank (in line with what we observed in Table 10). The results regarding the number of
bank relationships and default with the main bank are also consistent with those of Table 10.
Furthermore, we also ￿nd that ￿rms that record a higher credit overdue ratio are less likely to
establish a new bank relationship after default, even though we ￿nd the opposite result for the
loss rate. Thus, the results on default severity are not clear cut. The duration of exclusion has a
negative impact on the likelihood of obtaining a new loan with a new bank: the longer the ￿rm
takes to obtain a new bank loan, the less likely it becomes that the ￿rm is able to do so with
a new bank. Finally, the recession variable also plays an important role, in line with the results
we analyzed in the previous subsection. When a ￿rm emerges from default during a recessionary
episode, it is much easier to obtain a loan from a new bank than otherwise.
5.4 Recidivism
Thus far we have shown that many ￿rms are able to regain access to credit markets after default.
The probability of regaining access is especially high in the quarters immediately after the default
is resolved. If a ￿rm is not able to regain access during the ￿rst few quarters after default, it is
very unlikely that it ever will. Many banks are willing to give ￿rms a second chance and some
banks may o⁄er a loan to a new customer even if they had a default episode in their recent past.
However, an interesting, and somewhat surprising, result we obtained relates to the high levels
of recidivism. Previously, in Table 5, we showed that after 6 months around 16% of ￿rms were
in default again, and after 1 year this number increases to 24%. In fact, as shown in Table 4,
almost half of the ￿rms default again during the 3 years after their ￿rst default episode is resolved.
22In order to understand better why some ￿rms default again while others do not, we conduct an
analysis similar to those in Tables 6 and 7, but for the event of a ￿rm defaulting again. The results
are presented in Table 12 for the broad access de￿nition.
Table 12 around here
From Table 12 we see that ￿rms that default again are, on average, smaller and their default
episode was more severe and longer.
In Table 13, we present the results of Cox regressions, having as dependent variable the time
it takes for a ￿rm to default again after having resolved the ￿rst default episode.
Table 13 around here
We ￿nd that ￿rms are more likely to default again if they are larger, have more bank rela-
tionships, and if they have defaulted with their main lender. Quite surprisingly, ￿rms with more
severe and longer defaults take more time to default again. However, this last result deserves a
more careful analysis. In fact, this repeated default is conditional on regaining access to credit
which, as we found previously, is less likely for ￿rms with long and severe episodes of ￿nancial
distress28.
As before, we explore the time e⁄ects, observing that these are indeed signi￿cant. In fact, when
we control for whether ￿rms emerged from default during a recession, we observe that if this is
the case then the ￿rm is less likely to default again. Thus, if a ￿rm is able to overcome the severe
￿nancial distress that led to a bank loan default during a recession, its future default probability
declines signi￿cantly.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated several questions: What happens to ￿rms after they default on their
bank loan obligations?; What happens to ￿rms while they are in default?; How many ￿rms are
28For robustness purposes, we ran the same regressions, but conditional on ￿rms regaining access to new bank
loans, i.e., the strict access de￿nition. The results are qualitatively similar, with the exception of default duration:
￿rms with longer distress episodes default faster, conditional on having regained access to a new bank loan after
default. The variable number of bank relationships also becomes statistically insigni￿cant. These results are available
upon request.
23able to overcome ￿nancial distress and regain access to bank credit?; Which default characteristics
in￿ uence these outcomes? To address these questions we used a unique dataset from Portugal, the
Central Credit Register, which gathers information on all loans above 50 euros that are granted
by any ￿nancial institution operating in Portugal.
We began by analyzing what happens while ￿rms are still ￿in default￿and afterwards, in the
second part of our paper, we devoted ourselves to examine what happens after ￿rms are no longer
classi￿ed as ￿in default￿ .
With respect to the ￿in default￿period, our main ￿ndings are:
i) Defaults became more frequent during the sample period, but also became smaller and less
severe;
ii) The median duration of default is 5 quarters, and this value had some variation over time;
iii) Default episodes can either be very short-lived or very long. If a default episode is not
resolved in less than 1 year it can take several years to be cleared;
iv) The duration of default is positively correlated with its severity. Moreover, ￿rms that stay
longer in default are typically ￿rms that entered default in worse conditions than the ones that
exit faster;
v) Of all default events that we analyzed, only one third of these lead to write-o⁄s. For those
loans that lead to a write-o⁄, the average loss incurred by banks was around 34%, while the average
loss when all loans are considered (i.e., with and without write-o⁄s) was slightly above 10%.
Regarding what happens after the default episode is cleared, our main results are:
i) In the ￿rst quarter after leaving default, almost two thirds of ￿rms have access to credit
again, even though only one quarter was able to have access to a new bank loan;
ii) Exclusion from credit markets is either very short or very long. Firms that are not able to
regain access in the ￿rst year after exiting default are very unlikely to ever regain access;
iii) The severity of the default impacts the duration of exclusion: the more severe the default
was, the longer the ￿rm is unable to borrow. This is true for the amount defaulted on, the amount
that was written-o⁄, and the duration of default;
iv) Firms regain access mainly with the banks with whom they had previously ongoing re-
lationships. However, as time goes by, ￿rms are more likely to regain access through new bank
relationships;
24v) There is a very high rate of recidivism: one year after exiting default, almost 25% of ￿rms
are in default again. We ￿nd that recidivism is related to the severity of default;
vi) Firms that leave default during recession periods regain access to credit faster and are less
likely to default again.
These results provide valuable empirical evidence on corporate post-default dynamics, an issue
that, in our opinion, has not been su¢ ciently explored in the literature. However, many questions
remain unanswered, some of which are raised by the results discussed above. Therefore, future
research will focus on understanding whether banks charge higher interest rates after a default
event and also on what can explain such a high rate of recidivism.
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28Appendix 1
Bankruptcy legislation in Portugal and the US29
Portuguese bankruptcy code
The current bankruptcy code in Portugal, Code of Insolvency and Recovery of Undertakings,
came into force in 2004. It produced signi￿cant di⁄erences compared to earlier codes as the focus is
now solely on creditor rights. However, since a signi￿cant portion of Portuguese ￿rms experienced
reorganization prior to 2004, it is important to understand the previous codes.
1993 bankruptcy code (132/1993) - Code of Special Procedures for Recovery and Insolvency of
Businesses
The Recovery and Bankruptcy law of 1993 was designed to regulate a ￿rm￿ s recovery and
bankruptcy, with the focus placed on recovery. A ￿rm may declare bankruptcy if it is insolvent
or facing economic di¢ culties and must be done within 60 days of a missed payment. The most
important innovation introduced in this legislation related to privileged loans. Since the main
objective was to save economically-viable businesses and considering that the proliferation of priv-
ileges made this more di¢ cult, the number of privileged creditors was reduced. Once bankruptcy
was declared, any creditor privileges held by the Government, municipalities, and social security
institutions were immediately abolished, and going forward treated as ordinary creditors.
1998 bankruptcy amendment (316/1998) - Extrajudicial Procedure Agreement
The 1998 amendment governs out-of-court rescues of ￿rms that appear to be insolvent or
experiencing ￿nancial di¢ culties. The use of out-of-court rescues are intended to anticipate, and
if possible, replace the more costly insolvency proceedings and allow the ￿rm to choose which
creditors to negotiate with. Either the ￿rm or creditors can approach the Institute for Support
to Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises and Investment (IAPMEI) to request mediation in hopes
of producing a deal between the two parties. IAPMEI may refuse to mediate recovery talks if it
considers: 1) the ￿rm is economically unviable; 2) an agreement between the two parties is unlikely
to arise; or 3) the intervention is not seen as e⁄ective in the achievement of an agreement.
2004 bankruptcy code (53/2004) - Code of Insolvency and Recovery of Undertakings
29This is based on Davydenko and Franks (2008), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006), and European Judicial Network
(2007).
29The current legislation￿ s focus on creditor rights is designed to provide quick and workable
solutions that protect creditor rights as opposed to previous legislation that tried to balance creditor
rights with the possibility of rescuing the ￿rm.
A ￿rm is considered insolvent when liabilities clearly exceed their assets, while a ￿rm is classi￿ed
as being bankrupt if at least one of the following conditions is met:
￿ The debtor has generally failed to pay due debts;
￿ The debtor has failed to pay one or more of its debts, where this reveals its inability to
pay its debts in a timely manner;
￿ Shareholders or managers have ￿ ed without appointing proper successors, or the debtor￿ s
principal place of business has been abandoned;
￿ There has been dissipation or loss of the debtor￿ s assets, creation of ￿ctitious claims or
any other anomalous behavior that reveals the debtor￿ s intention to put itself in a position where
it will be unable to ful￿ll its obligations in a timely manner;
￿ It has been con￿rmed in an execution procedure that the debtor has no assets to attach;
￿ The debtor fails to ful￿ll the obligations set forth in an insolvency plan;
￿ Outstanding debts relating to taxes, employee claims, rent, or mortgage payments are at
least six months overdue; or
￿ The latest approved balance sheet reveals an unusual de￿cit, or the debtor is more than
nine months late in approving and depositing its accounts with the Trade Register O¢ ce30.
The debtor is required to apply for a declaration of insolvency within sixty days from the date
on which the individual becomes aware of the insolvency. If the debtor is the owner of the ￿rm,
there is a legal presumption of awareness of the situation of insolvency three months after a general
failure to meet tax or social security obligations or obligations arising under employment or rental
contracts.
From the perspective of unsecured or ordinary creditors, the main advantage of triggering a
formal bankruptcy procedure is that if the distressed company is restructured through the im-
plementation of an insolvency plan, they may recover more of their claims than they would have
had the company been declared bankrupt and subsequently liquidated. An additional advantage
30PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2006. The European Restructuring and Insolvency Guide.
30is that the creditors gain access to ￿nancial and other information that would otherwise remain
undisclosed or unavailable.
Lenders that provide new money or debtor-in-possession ￿nancing before a declaration of bank-
ruptcy has been issued have no legal priority, unless the real security granted of their claim is priv-
ileged. Lenders that provide new money or debtor-in-possession ￿nancing after the declaration of
bankruptcy has been issued will obtain preferential priority only if the insolvency plan makes an
express provision for this.
Insolvent ￿rms seeking recovery may proceed either via a formal or informal rescue process.
When utilizing the formal corporate rescue process, the insolvency plan must be agreed between
the debtor and its creditors, and determines how the debtor￿ s assets will be liquidated and the order
in which debts will be paid. In principle, the insolvency plan will treat all creditors equally. A plan
may be proposed by the administrator, the debtor, or any creditor or group of creditors representing
at least 20% of the total amount of unsubordinated claims. Under an informal corporate rescue
process, a company whose ￿nancial status would require it to ￿le for formal insolvency judicial
proceedings, or one of its creditors, can request IAPMEI to conduct a conciliation procedure with
the aim of reaching an agreement that provides for its economic recovery and the payment of its
debts.
United States bankruptcy code
For contextual purposes, we brie￿ y describe and compare the United States bankruptcy code to
Portugal￿ s in order to better understand the importance of the legislation. In the US, bankruptcy
legislation consists of two parts: Chapter 11, which covers reorganization and Chapter 7, which
covers liquidation.
Chapter 11 proceedings allow for ￿rm reorganization and may be initiated by either the ￿rm
(voluntary) or by creditors (involuntary). Chapter 11 reorganization involves the reversal of the
absolute priority rule, which states that senior creditors should be satis￿ed before junior, unsecured
creditors, or founders/ managers are allowed to preserve their equity in the reorganization process.
Old equity holders can recover some of the pre-petition values of their claims in reorganization if
they provide new capital to the ￿rm as new capital always gets priority over old capital in Chapter
11 proceedings since new capital is viewed as essential for ￿rm survival. All claims and interests are
31sorted into various classes: secured and unsecured creditors, priority creditors, and equity holders.
For a reorganization plan to be accepted, each class needs to have a majority of creditors (2/3 by
claim value) approve the plan.
Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code covers liquidation of both ￿rms and individuals assets.
Under a ￿ling of a Chapter 7 petition, an automatic stay stops more collection action against the
debtor or debtor￿ s property and an impartial case trustee is assigned to administer the case and
liquidate the debtor￿ s nonexempt assets or possibly operate the ￿rm for a limited period of time
if such an operation will bene￿t creditors and enhance the liquidation value of the estate.
The di⁄erences in the Portuguese and US bankruptcy codes are best seen from the perspective
of super-priority ￿nancing, automatic stays, and the legislation goals in general. The US legislation
considers both liquidation (Chapter 7) and reorganization (Chapter 11) and is considered to be
debtor friendly. Portugal￿ s newest bankruptcy code of 2004 moved away from debtor protection
and now only explicitly considers the liquidation of ￿rms and not the rescue and recovery of ￿rms31.
As part of this protection of creditors rights, Portugal￿ s legislation does not allow for auto-
matic stays from creditors whereas under US legislation, Chapter 11 allows ￿rms in reorganization
to postpone all repayments of capital and interest until reorganization is complete as a way of
preserving the company as an operating concern. Finally, super-priority ￿nancing under the Por-
tuguese system only occurs if an insolvency plan expressly provisions for this or if the ￿rm has
any collateral assets free to bank this potential claim, while under the US system ￿rms can use
super-priority ￿nancing without such limitations.
31The 1998 amendment covering out of court legislation considers ￿rm recovery.
32Portugal
Main Procedure Insolvency & Recovery of Undertakings (2004) Chapter 11 Chapter 7
Bankruptcy trigger Debtor applies to the court for a declaration of
insolvency
No objective test.  Solvent firm may enter
Chapter 11
No objective test
Control rights liquidation: creditors and court-appointed
administrator; recovery: debtor, creditors, and
administrator
Debtor, creditors collectively, bankruptcy court
supervision
Trustee
Automatic stay No Unlimited None
Super-priority financing Only if real security granted of their claim is
privileged; insolvency plan must make an
express provision for this.
Yes None
Dilution of secured claims Limited Limited None
United States
Source: Davydenko and Franks (2008), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006), European Judicial Network
(2007).




Number of quarters in default
Note: We exclude firms that were in default at 1995Q1 and at 2008Q4. A firm is considered to
be in default if it records liabilities with late repayments or loans in litigation for an entire
quarter. The quartiles are estimated by using the survivor function, taking into account the
first default episode of each firm. The year refers to the beginning of default. In 2006 it is not
possible to compute the 3rd quartile and in 2007 it is not possible to compute the 2nd and 3rd










































Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the beginning of the
first default episode. The survivor estimate is defined as the
probability of remaining in default until t: S(t)=Prob(T>=t)=1 - 
F(t).
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the beginning of the
first default episode. The hazard function is defined as the
probability of a firm leaving default in the time interval [t
t+dt), conditional on being in default: h(t) = lim
Prob(t<=T<t+dt | T>=t)/dt,a sdt->0. In the figure, the








































Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The hazard function is defined as the probability
of regaining access to credit in the time interval [t, t+dt),
conditional on not being in default: h(t) = lim Prob(t<=T<t+dt
| T>=t)/dt, as dt->0. More access is defined as having a larger
amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at
the end of the default episode and not having any record of
default or write-offs.
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The survivor estimate is defined as the
probability of regaining access after default at t:
S(t)=Prob(T>=t)=1 - F(t). More access is defined as having a
larger amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines)
than at the end of the default episode and not having any record
of default or write-offs.
Hazard function for time until more access
Figure 5





































Hazard function for time until access
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The survivor estimate is defined as the
probability of regaining access after default at t:
S(t)=Prob(T>=t)=1 - F(t). Access is defined as having a positive 
amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) without 
any record of default or write-offs, after having left default.
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The hazard function is defined as the probability
of regaining access to credit in the time interval [t, t+dt),
conditional on not being in default: h(t) = lim Prob(t<=T<t+dt
| T>=t)/dt, as dt->0. Access is defined as having a positive
amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) without 
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Number Mean (euros) Number Number % Mean 
(euros)
As a % 
of total 
credit







As a % of the 
number of firms 
with a loan 
(default rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1995 126,590 384,566 29,153 17,719 14.0 190,124 72.1 69.8 5,543 45,741 4.4
1996 138,471 382,397 24,530 18,353 13.3 188,366 74.7 72.4 6,634 64,970 4.8
1997 149,890 401,970 23,981 19,221 12.8 159,071 74.4 72.0 7,086 47,246 4.7
1998 164,463 425,245 26,560 18,854 11.5 147,865 74.0 71.6 6,000 42,107 3.6
1999 183,340 478,633 28,085 17,531 9.6 142,006 72.5 69.8 7,454 41,767 4.1
2000 202,693 534,377 27,440 19,485 9.6 118,813 69.6 67.1 8,213 24,165 4.1
2001 227,642 546,375 33,979 24,880 10.9 108,053 61.5 59.6 11,997 31,827 5.3
2002 253,211 568,362 35,010 29,122 11.5 98,057 59.2 56.8 15,522 32,089 6.1
2003 262,423 544,646 26,312 31,522 12.0 92,733 58.2 55.7 14,578 22,903 5.6
2004 272,855 523,897 24,253 33,322 12.2 83,908 59.9 57.2 13,353 24,502 4.9
2005 279,364 535,183 22,987 33,189 11.9 75,962 62.7 59.8 12,903 29,974 4.6
2006 288,852 556,805 25,633 34,440 11.9 73,246 60.6 57.9 14,983 22,058 5.2
2007 300,161 575,760 28,496 40,198 13.4 66,348 60.0 57.3 20,629 24,615 6.9
2008 307,840 608,527 25,442 45,120 14.7 74,241 60.5 57.8 20,270 35,721 6.6




Notes: Default is defined as the sum of liabilities with late repayments and of loans in litigation. We consider that there is a default only when a firm records a
loan in any of these two categories for an entire quarter. Column (1) refers to the total number of firms with a loan, in each quarter and column (2) shows the
average amount outstanding of each firm. Column (3) presents the number of new firms with a loan in each quarter, defined as firms that were not observed in
the CRC previously, during the sample period. The firms that were borrowing in 1995Q1 are not considered as new firms in 1995. Column (4) refers to the
number of firms that, in each quarter, record any amount in default. Column (5) presents the percentage of firms in default, computed as the ratio between the
number of firms in default (column 4) and the total number of firms with a loan (column 1), in each quarter. The percentage for the total is the weighted
average for the whole sample period. Column (6) refers to the average amount in default during the quarter. In column (7), the credit overdue ratio is defined as
the sum of loans in late repayment and in litigation at the end of each quarter, as a percentage of total credit granted to that firm. In column (8) this definition
is extended to include off-balance sheet liabilities in the denominator of this ratio (these include the unused amounts of credit lines, for instance). The new
episodes of default reported in columns (9), (10) and (11) refer to defaults recorded by firms without any default in the previous quarter. We exclude firms that









of firms in 
default
New episodes of default Credit overdue ratios 
for firms in default
 Table 2A - Evolution of the firms' situation since the beggining of the default episode
Number of 
observations
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median




1 165,165 31,919 2,870 37.9 13.9 375,300 30,170 2.47 2.0 1.3 1.0 68.9 66.7
2 110,208 48,675 5,000 49.9 36.9 327,402 26,302 2.37 2.0 1.4 1.0 75.2 100.0
3 86,674 63,107 7,071 58.4 67.3 315,105 24,890 2.32 2.0 1.5 1.0 79.2 100.0
4 70,016 77,239 9,510 64.4 88.4 307,386 25,115 2.31 2.0 1.6 1.0 82.0 100.0
5 60,348 87,083 11,220 69.5 98.9 296,448 24,753 2.28 2.0 1.7 1.0 84.3 100.0
6 50,377 96,381 12,450 72.8 100.0 332,136 24,773 2.29 2.0 1.8 1.0 85.9 100.0
7 42,618 106,597 14,690 75.4 100.0 291,051 26,115 2.31 2.0 1.8 1.0 87.1 100.0
Table 2B - Firm and loan characteristics for default episodes with different total durations
Number of 
observations
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median





1 54,957 20,958 1,730 26.8 6.6 472,415 34,890 2.6 2.0 1.1 1.0 62.3 50.0
2 23,534 24,666 2,290 33.9 10.8 316,803 28,031 2.4 2.0 1.2 1.0 68.1 60.0
3 16,658 27,249 2,340 43.7 20.0 297,521 19,105 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 73.3 100.0
4 9,668 32,193 2,860 40.8 17.5 288,447 24,530 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 72.9 100.0
5 9,971 39,706 4,228 53.5 49.0 231,072 21,803 2.1 2.0 1.4 1.0 78.8 100.0
6 7,759 23,755 2,610 54.9 56.1 623,269 14,020 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 79.4 100.0
7 5,591 36,689 4,190 50.2 34.9 249,616 21,760 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.0 76.9 100.0
8 4,112 43,909 4,110 46.3 27.2 239,700 26,640 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.0 74.7 100.0
Number of bank relations in 
default (as a % of the total 
number of relationships)  at 
start of default
Total amount of 
credit outstanding  
at start of default 
(euros)
Notes: In this table are depicted firm and loan characteristics for firms with different total durations of default (between 1 and 8 quarters). In each line, the variables refer
to the situation at the beginning of the default episode, for firms which default episodes lasted for x quarters. The number of bank relationships is computed as the number
of loans obtained from different financial institutions (including non-monetary financial institutions). 
Amount of credit 
overdue at start 
of default (euros)
Notes: In this table are depicted firm and loan characteristics for firms that have been in default for 1 quarter (line 1), 2 quarters (line 2), etc., up to7q u a r t e r s .I ne a c h
line, the variables refer to the situation in the x quarter after the default episode began. The number of bank relationships is computed as the number of loans obtained
from different financial institutions (including non-monetary financial institutions). 
Credit overdue 
ratio  at start 
of default (%)
Number of bank 
relationships  at 
start of default
Number of bank 
relationships in 
default  at start 
of default







Number of bank relations in 
default (as a % of the total 
number of relationships)
Amount of total 
credit outstanding 
(euros)
Number of bank 
relationships
  
Table 3 - Estimates of losses incurred by the banks
N mean p50 p75 p99 N mean p1 p50 p99 N mean p50 p99
%%%% %%%% % % %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1995 5,880 2.6 0.0 0.0 86.2 553 28.0 0.01 9.4 99.6 3,861 3.2 0.0 88.9
1996 6,229 6.9 0.0 0.0 97.0 1,235 34.7 0.04 19.4 99.9 3,851 8.9 0.0 98.7
1997 6,778 4.8 0.0 0.0 93.3 1,238 26.0 0.02 10.1 99.7 3,925 6.3 0.0 96.6
1998 8,626 8.7 0.0 0.0 99.3 1,805 41.8 0.00 35.0 100.0 5,889 11.5 0.0 99.8
1999 6,042 9.1 0.0 0.0 99.6 1,215 45.3 0.03 38.1 100.0 3,675 14.4 0.0 99.9
2000 6,382 8.5 0.0 0.0 98.9 1,354 40.1 0.02 26.8 99.9 3,501 12.9 0.0 99.5
2001 10,614 9.8 0.0 0.6 99.9 3,397 30.6 0.00 6.5 100.0 4,906 17.6 0.0 100.0
2002 12,234 9.8 0.0 0.7 99.0 3,840 31.2 0.00 8.6 99.9 6,220 17.8 0.0 99.8
2003 11,956 8.4 0.0 0.4 99.3 3,735 27.0 0.00 4.5 99.9 5,655 15.8 0.0 99.8
2004 13,163 11.1 0.0 1.5 99.7 4,627 31.7 0.00 8.0 100.0 6,740 19.2 0.0 99.8
2005 13,662 14.6 0.0 2.9 99.9 5,030 39.7 0.00 17.4 100.0 7,000 26.1 0.0 100.0
2006 14,636 15.4 0.0 4.5 99.9 5,761 39.0 0.00 18.3 100.0 7,230 29.0 1.5 100.0
2007 15,166 11.5 0.0 2.6 99.5 5,686 30.7 0.00 8.4 99.9 5,713 27.8 4.2 99.9
2008 12,945 11.2 0.0 3.1 99.6 4,828 30.1 0.01 10.3 99.9 5,327 25.1 4.2 99.9
Total 144,313 10.3 0.0 0.8 99.7 44,304 33.7 0.00 11.1 100.0 73,493 18.2 0.0 99.9
Notes: Estimates of losses incurred by the banks are based on write-offs and write-downs reported by banks to the Central
Credit Register. These losses do not include recovery costs and do not consider collateral. Losses are displayed as a
percentage of total loans outstanding after the default episode ends (i.e., once the firm does not record late repayments or
loans in litigation in the end of the following quarter). As in previous tables, observations refer to pairs firm-quarters,
which means that these loss estimates do not refer to a specific loan or bank, but to all outstanding credit liabilities of the 
firm. We exclude all observations in 2008Q4, the last quarter in the sample, given that these refer to situations still
unfolding.
Bank losses due to written-
off loans: including all loans 
whose default was longer 
than 1 year
Bank losses due to written-
off loans: including all loans
Bank losses due to written-off 
loans: only including events 
that originated a write-off
  
 
Table 4 - After leaving default
Number % of total 
(col. 3)
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
1995 5,880 10.6 2,222 1,764 79.4 1,223 55.0 225 10.1 330 20.5 780 48.4 27 1.7 17 1.1 458 28.4
1996 6,229 10.6 3,769 2,624 69.6 2,075 55.1 492 13.1 641 16.5 1,748 44.9 313 8.0 49 1.3 1,145 29.4
1997 6,778 11.4 3,847 2,785 72.4 1,722 44.8 580 15.1 604 16.5 1,692 46.2 176 4.8 130 3.5 1,062 29.0
1998 8,626 14.8 4,978 3,190 64.1 2,586 51.9 477 9.6 538 11.6 1,701 36.7 209 4.5 396 8.5 1,788 38.6
1999 6,042 11.2 3,491 2,793 80.0 1,597 45.7 389 11.1 761 20.0 1,533 40.2 367 9.6 451 11.8 698 18.3
2000 6,382 11.2 3,704 3,036 82.0 1,944 52.5 300 8.1 545 15.3 1,624 45.6 238 6.7 487 13.7 668 18.8
2001 10,614 15.5 6,976 5,827 83.5 3,564 51.1 418 6.0 1,189 18.2 3,149 48.2 582 8.9 462 7.1 1,149 17.6
2002 12,234 14.7 6,997 5,985 85.5 3,436 49.1 594 8.5 1,091 16.2 3,713 55.0 471 7.0 466 6.9 1,012 15.0
2003 11,956 12.9 7,014 6,037 86.1 3,472 49.5 655 9.3 957 13.4 3,950 55.3 528 7.4 735 10.3 977 13.7
2004 13,163 13.8 7,578 6,660 87.9 3,202 42.3 694 9.2 752 9.8 3,674 48.0 873 11.4 1,438 18.8 918 12.0
2005 13,662 13.5 7,433 6,359 85.6 3,204 43.1 778 10.5 577 8.6 3,274 49.0 685 10.2 1,076 16.1 1,074 16.1
2006 14,636 14.7 7,942 6,861 86.4 - - - - 662 7.9 3,149 37.4 1,185 14.1 2,352 27.9 1,081 12.8
2007 15,166 13.6 8,860 7,201 81.3 - - - - 985 11.5 3,800 44.4 676 7.9 1,442 16.8 1,659 19.4
2008 12,945 10.0 7,668 6,059 79.0 - - - - 920 9.6 4,235 44.4 1,025 10.7 1,751 18.4 1,609 16.9
Total 144,313 12.8 82,479 67,181 81.5 28,025 48.3 5602 9.7 10,552 12.8 38,022 46.1 7,355 8.9 11,252 13.6 15,298 18.5
Notes: A default episode is considered resolved if there is no record of loans with late repayments or in litigation in the end of the following quarter. We exclude firms that were in default in 2008Q4, the last quarter of
the sample. The definition of first defaults only takes into account information since 1995. Column (2) considers the number of default episodes resolved as a % of the number of observations in default. In columns (6)
to (9) there is no information for the last 3 years given that a 3 year window is used. After default, firms can either continue to be observed in the credit register (columns 4 and 10-17) or they can cease to appear in the
CRC (column 18). In the latter case firms can have either ceased to operate or they can still be in operation but without having access to loans from financial institutions. By construction, there are no firms in default
in the quarter after the default episode ended. Firms with more access (column 10) are those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of










Firms that continue in 
the credit register in 
the quarter after their 
first default ends
Firms that record 
a new default 
episode in the 3 
years after exiting 
default




a % of 
defaults in 
each year
Not in credit 
register






Firms with access 
but still with 
written-off loans
Firms only with 
written-off loans 
(no access)
Firms with access 
(but less than 
before)
Firms that are not 
in the CRC in the 3 
years after exiting 
default
 Table 5 - Distributions over time of possible outcomes after leaving default
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Time since first default episode ended
1 quarter 10,552 12.8 38,022 46.1 7,355 8.9 11,252 13.6 - - 15,298 18.5 82,479
6 months 9,074 11.4 27,435 34.6 4,994 6.3 10,100 12.7 13,003 16.4 14,792 18.6 79,398
1 year 8,292 11.1 20,314 27.2 3,575 4.8 9,069 12.1 17,914 23.9 15,647 20.9 74,811
2 years 7,172 10.9 14,310 21.7 2,116 3.2 7,953 12.1 16,343 24.8 18,057 27.4 65,951
3 years 6,398 11.0 10,799 18.6 1,777 3.1 6,985 12.0 13,245 22.8 18,805 32.4 58,009
Notes: This table depicts snapshots of the distribution of possible outcomes after default in different moments in time (namely, 1 quarter, 2 quarters and 1, 2 and 
3 years after default ends). A default episode is considered resolved if there is no record of loans with late repayments or in litigation in the end of the following
quarter. We exclude firms that were in default in 2008Q4, the last quarter in the sample, and consider only the first default episode of each firm during the
sample period. After default, firms can either continue to be observed in the credit register (columns 1-10) or they can cease to appear in the CRC (columns 11-
12). In the latter case firms can have either ceased to operate or they can still be in operation but without having access to loans from financial institutions. By
construction, there are no firms in default in the quarter after the default episode ended. Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank loans
(including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs. Firms with less access than before are those which
have the same or less loans outstandings that at the end of the default episode. 
Total
Not in credit 
register
Firms with more 




Firms with access 
but still with 
written-off loans






access (but less 
than before)
 
 Table 6 - Characteristics of firms that regain access after their first default episode - broad access definition
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Media
n
diff Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 28,606 592,326 48,325 24,716 66,795 7,292 525,532 8.9 *** 17,197 643,922 57,860 25,790 81,531 10,050 562,391 8.1 ***
Credit overdue 28,606 29,743 1,900 24,716 23,310 2,840 6,433 3.2 *** 17,197 33,087 2,020 25,790 22,179 2,644 10,908 4.1 ***
Credit overdue ratio 28,606 20.9 5 24,716 83.5 100.0 -62.6 -230.0 *** 17,197 21.1 5 25,790 69.6 100.0 -48.5 -140.0 ***
Write-offs 28,606 1,774 0 24,716 19,336 0 -17,562 -17.1 *** 17,197 2,183 0 25,790 13,736 0 -11,553 -12.6 ***
Loss estimates (%) 28,606 0.8 0 24,716 14.2 0 -13.5 -69.2 *** 17,197 1.0 0 25,790 10.5 0 -9.5 -55.0 ***
Duration of default 28,606 2.4 1 24,716 7.5 5 -5.2 -94.9 *** 17,197 2.4 1 25,790 5.7 3 -3.3 -72.8 ***
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 28,606 2.8 2 24,716 1.3 1 1.5 121.36 *** 17,197 3.0 2 25,790 1.5 1 1.5 91.1 ***
No. of bank relat. in default 28,606 1.1 1 24,716 1.2 1 -0.1 -30.71 *** 17,197 1.1 1 25,790 1.2 1 -0.1 -20.9 ***
No. of bank relat. in default %  28,606 54.2 50 24,716 95.0 100 -40.8 -200.0 *** 17,197 51.2 50 25,790 87.8 100 -36.6 -140.0 ***
Default with main bank 28,606 0.5 1 24,716 0.9 1 -0.4 -100.0 *** 17,197 0.5 1 25,790 0.8 1 -0.3 -74.0 ***
Notes: Firms with access are those with outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) and without any record of default or write-offs after 1 year (columns 1 - 3) or 3 years (columns 9-11). Firms
without access are those that are not in the credit register after leaving default, as well as those which continue to be present in the credit register, but only with written-off loans. The results for 1
year after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2006, 2007 or 2008. All variables
are defined as in previous tables and refer to the last period of default. Mean difference tests are computed assuming unequal variances in the two groups considered. * significant at 10%, **






Firms with access Firms without access
After 3 years After 1 year
Firms with access Firms without access Mean difference
 Table 7 - Characteristics of firms that regain access after their first default episode - strict access definition
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Media
n
diff Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 8,292 934,087 56,871 45,030 240,940 17,971 693,147 4.5 *** 6,398 696,117 44,875 36,589 238,390 17,550 457,727 3.5 ***
Credit overdue 8,292 29,349 1,490 45,030 26,284 2,490 3,064 1.1 6,398 23,552 1,329 36,589 27,066 2,640 -3,513 -1.5
Credit overdue ratio 8,292 21.4 4 45,030 55.2 63.4 -33.8 -79.8 *** 6,398 23.2 5 36,589 54.9 58.8 -31.7 -64.5 ***
Write-offs 8,292 3,554 0 45,030 11,085 0 -7,531 -6.1 *** 6,398 2,784 0 36,589 10,221 0 -7,437 -7.1 ***
Loss estimates (%) 8,292 1.1 0 45,030 8.1 0 -7.0 -49.7 *** 6,398 1.0 0 36,589 7.6 0 -6.6 -43.3 ***
Duration of default 8,292 2.3 1 45,030 5.2 2 -2.9 -65.8 *** 6,398 2.3 1 36,589 4.7 2 -2.5 -54.9 ***
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 8,292 3.0 2 45,030 1.9 1 1.1 44.4 *** 6,398 3.0 2 36,589 1.9 1 1.1 37.0 ***
No. of bank relat. in default 8,292 1.1 1 45,030 1.1 1 -0.1 -21.3 *** 6,398 1.1 1 36,589 1.1 1 -0.1 -20.0 ***
No. of bank relat. in default %  8,292 51.1 50 45,030 77.1 100 -26.0 -71.6 *** 6,398 52.3 50 36,589 76.8 100 -24.5 -58.7 ***
Default with main bank 8,292 0.5 0 45,030 0.7 1 -0.3 -44.3 *** 6,398 0.5 0 36,589 0.7 1 -0.3 -37.6 ***
After 3 years
Firms with more access 
than before
Firms without access or 




Firms with more access than 
before
Firms without access or 




Notes: Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs after 1 year
(columns 1 - 3) or 3 years (columns 9-11). Firms without access or with less access than before are those that are not in the credit register after leaving default, those that continue to be present in
the credit register, but only with written-off loans, as well as those that have the same or less loans outstandings that at the end of the default episode. The results for 1 year after default exclude
firms that defaulted for the first time in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2006, 2007 or 2008. All variables are defined as in previous







 Table 8 - Cox regressions: determinants of time until access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) 1.016 1.015 1.015 1.015 1.010 1.008 1.007 1.008
9.76 9.24 8.83 9.29 2.10 1.73 1.58 1.74
Credit overdue ratio (%) 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997
-61.40 -63.49 -63.61 -63.47 -6.11 -9.83 -10.34 -9.83
Loss rate (%) 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980
-37.74 -37.62 -37.73 -37.61 -20.14 -19.99 -19.93 -19.99
Duration of default (quarters) 0.937 0.939 0.940 0.939 0.921 0.927 0.928 0.927
-48.85 -47.26 -46.51 -47.24 -28.25 -26.26 -25.79 -26.25
No. of bank relationships 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.956 1.010 1.008 1.007 1.008
-23.71 -24.07 -23.98 -24.09 1.85 1.45 1.40 1.44
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
-31.97 -31.03 -30.87 -31.04 -15.78 -15.22 -15.06 -15.22
Default with main bank (binary) 1.058 1.063 1.063 1.063 0.877 0.896 0.898 0.896
11.86 12.75 12.61 12.80 -8.02 -6.69 -6.58 -6.68
Recession (binary) - - - 1.092 - - - 1.103
--- 6 . 2 5 -- - 1.86
D_1996 - 1.145 - 1.145 - 1.421 - 1.421
- 13.82 - 13.82 - 10.03 - 10.04
D_1997 - 1.170 - 1.170 - 1.335 - 1.335
- 16.00 - 16.00 - 8.28 - 8.28
D_1998 - 1.159 - 1.159 - 1.424 - 1.425
- 14.51 - 14.51 - 10.59 - 10.59
D_1999 - 0.977 - 0.977 - 1.515 - 1.515
- -2.00 - -2.00 - 13.21 - 13.21
D_2000 - 1.010 - 1.010 - 1.326 - 1.326
- 0.96 - 0.96 -8 . 4 7-8 . 4 7
D_2001 - 1.040 - 1.040 - 1.485 - 1.485
- 4.78 - 4.79 - 14.31 - 14.31
D_2002 - 0.996 - 0.996 - 1.226 - 1.226
- -0.48 - -0.48 -7 . 3 7-7 . 3 7
D_2003 - 1.039 - 0.952 - 0.967 - 0.877
-4 . 9 9 -- 3 . 1 0 --1.14 -- 2 . 1 8
D_2004 - 0.932 - 0.912 - 0.852 - 0.831
- -8.28 - -9.76 - -5.29 - -5.56
D_2005 - 0.990 - 0.990 - 0.856 - 0.856
- -1.10 - -1.10 - -4.96 - -4.96
D_2006 - 0.951 - 0.951 - 0.916 - 0.916
- -5.47 - -5.47 - -2.89 - -2.89
D_2007 - 0.982 - 0.982 - 1.085 - 1.085
- -2.25 - -2.25 - 2.92 - 2.92
Quarter dummies N N Y N N N Y N
Number of subjects 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980
Number of failures 54,282 54,282 54,282 54,282 21,055 21,055 21,055 21,055
Time at risk 384,240 384,240 384,240 384,240 893,125 893,125 893,125 893,125
Log-likelihood -589,282 -589,180 -589,097 -589,177 -226,434 -226,022 -225,864 -226,020
Notes: z-scores in italics. All models estimated using a Cox regression that evaluates the time until access using robust variance
estimates. An estimated coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until access. In columns (1) -
(4), the dependent variable is the time until access using the broad definition (see Table 6). In columns (5) - (8) it is considered the
strict definition of access (see Table 7). All explanatory variables are defined as in previous tables (except recession, which is a
dummy variable that takes the value one in recession years) and refer to the last period of default.




 Table 9 - Regaining access through new banks
%% %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1995 330 136 41.2 - - - - - -
1996 641 226 35.3 356 210 59.0 - - -
1997 604 200 33.1 467 282 60.4 - - -
1998 538 214 39.8 529 291 55.0 349 265 75.9
1999 761 227 29.8 534 318 59.6 505 371 73.5
2000 545 223 40.9 469 292 62.3 564 424 75.2
2001 1,189 559 47.0 541 385 71.2 569 481 84.5
2002 1,091 412 37.8 1,239 811 65.5 411 342 83.2
2003 957 262 27.4 766 432 56.4 456 388 85.1
2004 752 188 25.0 670 389 58.1 997 804 80.6
2005 577 171 29.6 630 375 59.5 719 562 78.2
2006 662 160 24.2 547 322 58.9 657 509 77.5
2007 985 266 27.0 652 366 56.1 629 506 80.4
2008 920 177 19.2 892 464 52.0 542 427 78.8
Total 10,552 3,421 32.4 8,292 4,937 59.5 6,398 5,079 79.4
Notes: Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit
lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs. Firms 
with more access and with a new bank defined as those borrowing from a bank which was not a
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 Table 10 - Characteristics of firms that regain access with a new bank after their first default episode (strict definition)
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 4,937 451,545 48,400 3,355 1,644,164 73,480 -1,192,619 -3.3 *** 5,079 345,756 42,100 1,319 2,045,234 61,860 -1,699,478 -2.8 ***
Credit overdue 4,937 22,214 1,221 3,355 39,848 2,150 -17,635 -2.9 *** 5,079 21,043 1,180 1,319 33,217 2,245 -12,174 -2.1 **
Credit overdue ratio 4,937 20.9 4 3,355 22.1 4.0 -1.2 -1.6 5,079 23.2 5 1,319 23.1 4.2 0.1 0.1
Write-offs 4,937 3,151 0 3,355 4,149 0 -998 -0.5 5,079 2,351 0 1,319 4,450 0 -2,099 -0.8
Loss estimates (%) 4,937 1.0 0 3,355 1.2 0 -0.1 -0.8 5,079 0.9 0 1,319 1.5 0 -0.6 -2.1 **
Duration of default 4,937 2.3 1 3,355 2.3 1 -0.1 -1.0 5,079 2.3 1 1,319 2.2 1 0.1 0.8
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 4,937 2.9 3 3,355 3.3 2 -0.4 -7.1 *** 5,079 2.8 2 1,319 3.6 2 -0.7 -7.6 ***
No. of bank relat. in default 4,937 1.1 1 3,355 1.1 1 0.0 -1.5 5,079 1.1 1 1,319 1.1 1 0.0 -0.6
No. of bank relat. in default %  4,937 51.8 50 3,355 50.1 50 1.7 2.5 ** 5,079 53.1 50 1,319 49.0 50 4.1 4.3 ***
Default with main bank 4,937 0.5 0 3,355 0.5 0 0.0 1.8 * 5,079 0.5 0 1,319 0.4 0 0.1 3.3 ***
t-test
Firms with more access 
than before and a new bank
Firms with more access 
than before but not with a 
new bank
After 3 years After 1 year
Firms with more access than 
before and a new bank
Firms with more access than 
before but not with a new 
bank
Mean difference
Notes: Firms with more access and a new bank are those with more outstanding bank loans from a new bank (including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or
write-offs after 1 year (columns 1 - 3) or 3 years (columns 9-11). Firms with more access than before but not with a new bank have the same characteristics, with the exception of borrowing from a new bank.
The results for 1 year after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2006, 2007 or 2008. Only firms
with less than 9 bank relationships are considered. All variables are defined as in previous tables and refer to the last period of default. Mean difference tests are computed assuming unequal variances in the







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) -0.082 -0.079 -0.082 -0.079
-9.71 -9.63 -9.99 -9.64
Credit overdue ratio (%) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
-7.99 -8.20 -8.51 -8.21
Loss rate (%) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
2.75 2.46 2.02 2.47
Duration of default (quarters) -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
-1.31 -1.23 -0.90 -1.23
No. of bank relationships -0.013 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016
-1.90 -2.22 -2.02 -2.21
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.61 -0.17 0.02 -0.17
Default with main bank (binary) 0.023 0.029 0.036 0.030
0.99 1.27 1.56 1.31
Duration of exclusion (quarters) -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
-11.12 -9.39 -9.57 -9.39
Constant 0.871 0.583 0.545 0.583
9.24 6.05 5.00 6.05
Recession (binary) --- 0 . 1 4 5
--- 2 . 0 5
Year dummies N Y N Y
Quarter dummies N N Y N
Number of observations 21,055 21,055 21,055 21,055
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Wald test 315.7 609.1 867.2 613.8
Log pseudolikelihood -14,110 -13,970 -13,836 -13,968
Dependent variable: access with a new 
bank (strict definition)
Notes:  z-scores in italics. All models estimated using a probit regression using robust 
variance estimates. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if the firm is able to obtain a new loan from a new bank within the 3 years after its
first default episode is resolved; and takes the value 0 if the firm obtains a new loan
in the same situation, but not from a new bank (see Table 10). Only firms with less
than 9 bank relationships are considered. All explanatory variables are defined as in
previous tables (except for the duration of exclusion, which measures the number of
quarters since the default is resolved until the firm obtains a new loan under our
strict access definition) and refer to the last period of default.
Table 11 - Probit regressions: determinants of the likelihood of 
obtaining a new loan from a new bank
 
 Table 12 - Characteristics of firms that regain access but default again
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 17,914 318,697 39,469 28,606 592,326 48,325 -273,630 -4.5 *** 13,245 397,972 57,080 17,197 643,922 57,860 -245,950 -3.2 ***
Credit overdue 17,914 27,630 3,250 28,606 29,743 1,900 -2,112 -1.0 13,245 33,277 4,065 17,197 33,087 2,020 190 0.1
Credit overdue ratio 17,914 36.0 12 28,606 20.9 5 15.1 42.0 *** 13,245 32.4 9 17,197 21.1 5 11.3 26.6 ***
Write-offs 17,914 12,114 0 28,606 1,774 0 10,341 5.8 *** 13,245 14,574 0 17,197 2,183 0 12,392 4.9 ***
Loss estimates (%) 17,914 5.4 0 28,606 0.8 0 4.6 31.8 *** 13,245 4.9 0 17,197 1.0 0 3.9 23.7 ***
Duration of default 17,914 4.1 2 28,606 2.4 1 1.7 38.5 *** 13,245 3.6 2 17,197 2.4 1 1.2 26.1 ***
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 17,914 2.5 2 28,606 2.8 2 -0.2 -13.1 *** 13,245 2.9 2 17,197 3.0 2 -0.1 -4.5 ***
No. of bank relat. in default 17,914 1.2 1 28,606 1.1 1 0.1 32.8 *** 13,245 1.2 1 17,197 1.1 1 0.1 26.3 ***
No. of bank relat. in default %  17,914 65.2 50 28,606 54.2 50 11.0 36.9 *** 13,245 59.2 50 17,197 51.2 50 8.1 22.4 ***
Default with main bank 17,914 0.6 1 28,606 0.5 1 0.1 22.7 *** 13,245 0.6 1 17,197 0.5 1 0.1 12.9 ***
t-test
(8)
Notes: Firms again in default are those that record a new default episode after 1 year (columns 1-3) or 3 years (columns 9-11). Firms with access are those with outstanding bank loans
(including credit lines) and without any record of default or write-offs after 1 year (columns 4 - 6) or 3 years (columns 12-14). The results for 1 year after default exclude firms that resolved
their first default episode in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default exclude firms that resolved their first default episode in 2006, 2007 or 2008. All variables are defined as in previous





Firms again in default
After 3 years
Firms again in default Firms with access and 
without default





 Table 13 - Cox regressions: determinants of time until new default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) 1.033 1.032 1.032 1.032
11.02 10.67 10.65 10.69
Credit overdue ratio (%) 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.994
-29.58 -32.26 -32.64 -32.28
Loss rate (%) 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
-10.58 -9.98 -9.88 -9.99
Duration of default (quarters) 0.987 0.989 0.990 0.989
-12.30 -9.84 -9.42 -9.90
No. of bank relationships 1.031 1.029 1.029 1.029
7.02 6.58 6.59 6.57
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002
8.07 8.42 8.53 8.42
Default with main bank (binary) 1.165 1.176 1.178 1.176
12.29 12.90 13.05 12.90
Recession (binary) --- 0 . 8 3 3
--- - 4 . 6 1
D_1996 - 1.390 - 1.389
- 11.13 - 11.12
D_1997 - 1.502 - 1.502
- 16.76 - 16.75
D_1998 - 0.967 - 0.967
- -1.14 - -1.15
D_1999 - 1.221 - 1.221
-8 . 4 0-8 . 3 9
D_2000 - 0.990 - 0.990
- -0.39 - -0.39
D_2001 - 1.069 - 1.068
-2 . 8 6-2 . 8 6
D_2002 - 1.110 - 1.110
-5 . 1 3-5 . 1 3
D_2003 - 1.018 - 1.221
- 0.85 -4 . 4 8
D_2004 - 0.853 - 0.890
- -7.56 - -5.14
D_2005 - 0.873 - 0.873
- -6.40 - -6.40
D_2006 - 0.910 - 0.910
- -4.54 - -4.54
D_2007 - 1.144 - 1.144
-7 . 0 3-7 . 0 3
D_2008 - - - -
----
Quarter dummies N N Y N
Number of subjects 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980
Number of failures 39,756 39,756 39,756 39,756
Time at risk 681,425 681,425 681,425 681,425
Log-likelihood -420,012 -419,623 -419,009 -419,613
Failure event: new default
Notes: Notes: z-scores in italics. All models estimated using a Cox regression that
evaluates the time until a new default, using robust variance estimates. An estimated
coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until
default. The dependent variable is the time until a new default occurs after the first
default episode is resolved. All explanatory variables are defined as in previous tables 
and refer to the last period of default.Banco de Portugal | Working Papers i
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